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Professor Lobel premises his review on a flattering, but ultimately ill-
chosen, comparison between my book and John Hart Ely's Democracy
and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. Both books, in his view, erro-
neously develop a "process-based theory of the Constitution," and must
therefore answer the same, familiar objection: that "it is theoretically
impossible to divide process from substance."1 Perhaps both books
could be called "process-based" in the broad sense that each offers pro-
posals to protect and improve the decision making processes of American
governmental institutions. But there fruitful comparison largely ends.
As its subtitle makes clear, Professor Ely's book sought to address Alex-
ander Bickel's "counter-majoritarian difficulty" by endorsing a constitu-
tional theory of judicial review that would limit courts to policing the
processes of representative government.2 My book addresses a wholly
different problem - the decline of our constitutional system of checks
and balances in foreign affairs - and proposes an entirely different solu-
tion: legislative reform, through enactment of a framework statute (a
"national security charter") to promote the balanced participation of all
three branches of government in national security decision making.
Unlike Democracy and Distrust, The National Security Constitution
does not propound process-protecting principles to limit judicial involve-
ment in constitutional adjudication. To the contrary, it urges legislation
that would encourage both the courts and Congress to resume their con-
stitutionally prescribed involvement in foreign affairs decision making.
Thus, far from propounding a theory that would place a constitutional
ceiling upon judicial review, my book proposes a legislative "floor" de-
vised to guarantee meaningful judicial and congressional participation in
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national security decisions. With particular regard to the courts, my
book argues not that judges have engaged in unprincipled activism, but
rather, in unprincipled abstention from constitutional and statutory adju-
dication, through indiscriminate application of such slippery concepts as
the political question doctrine, congressional standing, and equitable
discretion.
3
These differences not only spare me from having to refight Professor
Ely's battles; they also undermine Professor Lobel's specific criticisms of
my book. For my book nowhere makes the untenable claim that the
substance and process of our foreign policy can be artificially separated.
I merely suggest, as Professor Lobel himself -anticipates, "that even if
substantive goals were linked to structural reforms, the way to begin is to
reform the process. A process-oriented approach would not.., be an
end in itself, but simply the first. step in redefining both the structure and
substance of American foreign policy."1
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Professor Lobel responds that such procedural reform "is the same
approach that was tried in the 1970s and failed."15 But as my book dem-
onstrates, the procedural reforms of the 1970s failed not because they
focused on improving process, but because they overlooked institutional
incentives: the executive's incentives to act secretly and without consul-
tation, Congress' incentives to acquiesce, and the courts' incentives to
defer.6 The book's specific legislative proposals, most of which Professor
Lobel approves, aim to restore the constitutional roles of Congress and
the courts in a system of balanced institutional participation "not by ig-
noring, but by accounting for and revising, the incentives of the regulated
institutions."'
7
Professor Lobel finally claims that a fundamental transformation of
the substance of United States foreign policy must precede the kind of
procedural reform that I endorse. But how is such a substantive trans-
formation to occur when those who make our foreign policy lack effec-
tive institutional procedures for interbranch dialogue? My book argues
3. See H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURnY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 146-49 (1990) [hereinafter cited by page number only]. Ironically, an-
other reviewer has already faulted me for not urging that judicial review in foreign affairs be
restricted to examination of procedural issues. See Cole, Youngstown v. Curtiss-Wright (Book
Review), 99 YALE L. J. 2063, 2080 (1990) (arguing that "Koh's proposal is not ,modest
enough," because "the judicial role [in foreign affairs should be] narrowly circumscribed in the
first instance to enforcing procedures for congressional-executive interaction") (emphasis in
original).




Yale Journal of International Law
that the existing legal structure has too often allowed the branches to
avoid dialogue, thus impairing the creation of foreign policy consensus. 8
My reform proposals would promote institutional dialogue by forcing the
President to consult with Congress before he acts, by forcing Congress to
declare its approval or opposition to his actions promptly after they oc-
cur, and by encouraging both political branches to turn to the courts for
quick resolution of interbranch disputes over the legality of Presidential
conduct. 9
I do not deny the undeniable: the Cold War's end has confronted the
United States with many difficult foreign policy choices. The National
Security Constitution fully acknowledges that the branches of the United
States government must address these substantive questions.' 0 But if
Vietnam and the Iran-Contra Affair teach us anything, it is that in the
1990s, such substantive decisions should not be made by the executive
branch alone, but through executive action supplemented by congres-
sional role delineation and judicial guidance, a process that "would be
flexible enough to respond to unforeseen world events while remaining
true to the Founders' constitutional concept of balanced institutional
participation."" I agree with Professor Lobel that the political branches,
like partners in a marriage, must seek accord on matters of substance as
well as process. But how can the branches hope to forge the new sub-
stantive foreign policy consensus that Professor Lobel envisions unless
they first learn how to talk to one another and to respect each other's
right to participate in decision making?
At least Professor Lobel accepts The National Security Constitution's
major premise: that fundamental defects exist in the structure of our
national security decision-making process. Professor Trimble's review
both rejects that claim and repeats a troubling assertion that he has made
elsewhere: that the current state of foreign affairs decision making is jus-
tified because Congress, the courts, and the American people not only
accept, but affirmatively "want," the systematic accretion of Presidential
power in foreign affairs. 12 But his review misunderstands three key
points. First, the problem is systemic, not merely congressional. Second,
the congressional acquiescence Professor Trimble cites is not the justifi-
8. See pp. 8, 158-60, 205, 226.
9. Pp. 153-207.
10. See, eg., pp. 7, 120-21, 212, 224-28.
11. P. 227.
12. Compare Trimble, The Acquiescent Congress and Foreign Affairs, 15 YALE J. INT'L L.
345, 346 (1990) [hereinafter Trimble] with Trimble, The President's Foreign Affairs Power, 83
AM. . INT'L L. 750 (1989) and Trimble, The Constitutional Common Law of Treaty Interpre-




cation, but part of the problem. Third, and most important, even if Con-
gress does want to acquiesce in Presidential action, what ultimately
matters is not what Congress wants, but what the Constitution requires.
In reviewing American foreign policy since Vietnam - specifically
warmaking, treaty affairs, emergency economic powers, arms sales, mili-
tary aid, and covert operations - The National Security Constitution
reveals a recurrent historical pattern.' 3 In each of these areas, Congress
reacted to Presidential overreaching by enacting legislation, which never-
theless failed to prevent new overreaching. As my book repeatedly em-
phasizes, the President is not the only culprit in this recurring scenario.
The pattern has recurred in part because Congress has acquiesced in
Presidential initiatives and in part because the courts, through unjustifi-
ably deferential techniques of abstention and statutory construction, have
repeatedly read congressional silence or disapproval to constitute acqui-
escence in or approval of Presidential action.14 Thus, over time, our na-
tional security decision-making process "has degenerated into one in
which the president (or his people) acts, Congress reacts belatedly (if at
all), and the courts validate or defer."1 5
My intent in The National Security Constitution is not to engage in
President-bashing, but to expose this systemic imbalance. For Presi-
dents, I argue, have been as much the victims as they have been the vil-
lains in this continuing drama. The current decision-making system
"places too great a burden upon the president and the presidency, while
allowing Congress and the courts too easily to avoid constructive partici-
pation in important national decisions."1 6 The solution thus is not to
blame particular Presidents, so much as to restructure institutional
incentives. 17
It is against this systemic background that the particular problem of
congressional acquiescence must be viewed. As I argue, congressional
acquiescence results not merely from the fecklessness of individual mem-
bers, but from deeper institutional problems within Congress - what my
book describes as legislative myopia, inadequate drafting, ineffective leg-
13. Pp. 38-64.
14. See pp. 123-49.
15. P. 226.
16. P. 156.
17. [Ihe current structure of our national security system gives the executive branch
incentives to act; Congress, incentives to acquiesce; and the courts, incentives to refrain
from passing judgment on the conduct of the other two branches. The synergy among
these institutional incentive structures, not the motives of any single branch, best explains
the recurring pattern of executive adventurism and interbranch conflict in our postwar
foreign policy.
P. 156 (emphasis added).
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islative tools, and an institutional lack of political will. 8 The currently
fragmented and decentralized congressional structure has promoted a
state of near perpetual "institutional acquiescence," in which many indi-
vidual members hold strong views on foreign policy but lack the institu-
tional mechanisms for receiving information, building internal
consensus, or expressing their views collectively. Furthermore, a series
of broadly worded judicial decisions have not only construed legislative
silence as tacit approval for Presidential actions, but have also invali-
dated some of the few institutional mechanisms for collective expression
that did exist (the legislative veto, for example). 19 Over time, I argue,
these factors have systematically deprived Congress of much of its ability
to register nonacquiescence in Presidential initiatives. Thus, many of my
reform proposals are specifically directed at correcting this grave institu-
tional problem. 20
Professor Trimble's own analysis of Congress' institutional failings
largely tracks my own.2' This makes particularly puzzling his conclu-
sion that congressional and public acquiescence in Presidential faits ac-
complis somehow equals affirmative approval of those acts. From
pronouncing "accretions of Presidential power.., for the most part ac-
ceptable to Congress and the American public," he moves inexplicably to
the conclusion that such accretions are strongly desired.22 "The foreign
policy implicated in Iran-Contra," he says, "unlike the Vietnam War,
was not deeply unpopular. ' 23 But it is a long way from a "not deeply
unpopular" executive policy to a policy that Congress and the people
affirmatively want. Did Congress or the people "want" President Rea-
gan to trade arms for hostages? Did they "want" President Bush to send
his National Security Assistant secretly to China after the Tiananmen
Square massacre? In both cases, of course, the President or his men
acted unilaterally, without checking to see what Congress and the people
"wanted," then presented the results of their actions as faits accomplis.
That Congress and the public have, to varying degrees, acquiesced in
18. Pp. 123-33.
19. See pp. 134-46 (describing, inter alia, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981);
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). Professor Trimble
doubts that these cases would have been better decided under Justice Jackson's concurring
analysis in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952), an analysis he
deems "obscure". See Trimble, supra note 12, at 356. But as my book demonstrates, the
problem with Jackson's Youngstown analysis lies not in its lack of clarity, but in the way the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts have misapplied it in these cases. See pp. 138-43.
20. See generally pp. 166-81, 189-202.
21. Compare Trimble, supra note 12, at 351-54 with pp. 123-33.
22. Trimble, supra note 12, at 346 (emphasis added).




these initiatives hardly means they would have approved if consulted in
advance.
To this Professor Trimble answers that Congress and the people don't
want to know in advance. They "want Presidential leadership, which
requires correlative Presidential power." 24 But as my book makes clear,
the only true way to reflect what the people "want" in foreign policy is to
ensure that their chosen congressional representatives have regular op-
portunity to participate in the decision-making process. 25 In response,
Professor Trimble cites the failure of the War Powers Resolution, 26 the
National Security Act of 1947,27 the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act,28 and other post-Vietnam framework statutes as proof that
"the dominant view in Congress is that the President should be, almost
always, free to act." 29 But as my book illustrates, the fact that the execu-
tive branch has been able, with judicial complicity, to exploit and expand
loopholes in these framework statutes hardly demonstrates that Congress
enacted them with the intent that they be emasculated. Certainly, Con-
gress enacted many of these statutes with an intent to delegate to the
President additional powers. But at least equally important was Con-
gress' determination to subject those powers to the procedural con-
straints of consultation, reporting, committee oversight, and public
declaration. The Executive has repeatedly sought to decouple these dele-
gated authorities from their accompanying constraints. 30 During recent
military interventions in Grenada, Libya, the Persian Gulf, and Panama,
for example, the President ignored or paid lip service to the War Powers
Resolution's clear procedural requirements of consultation, notice, and
mandatory withdrawal. 31 During the Iran-Contra affair, the executive
branch ignored numerous procedural requirements in the arms export
24. d at 346.
25. My book rejects the notion that unilateral Presidential decision making is somehow
"more democratic" than decision making made through balanced institutional participation.
See pp. 225-26 ("Although the president and vice-president are now essentially popularly
elected, they are the only two members of the executive branch who are, and even they do not
face re-election during their second terms."). Presidential elections hardly constitute binding
votes on foreign policy issues, and as we have recently seen, first-term presidents may not feel
bound even by campaign promises that are prefaced by the words "Read my lips." The Iran-
Contra affair offers a particularly vivid example of undemocratic decision making, in which
unelected executive officials nullified numerous statutory provisions enacted through the dem-
ocratic process, allegedly without the supervision or authorization of any elected officials. See
pp. 113-16.
26. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982).
27. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-05 (1982).
28. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1982).
29. Trimble, supra note 12, at 352.
30. See pp. 45-48.
31. See pp. 38-40.
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statutes and read the requirement of "timely notice" in the intelligence
laws to mean "no notice." 32 Congress intended all of these statutory
contraints to be self-executing, but the courts have refused to enforce
them and members have been unable to muster the bicameral two-thirds
votes necessary to sustain new laws to enforce those already on the
books. That such a structurally disempowered Congress often acquiesces
hardly constitutes proof that "Congress wants it that way."
'33
Professor Trimble further mistakes a widely held desire for Presiden-
tial leadership - which I share34 - as somehow mandating blanket con-
gressional approval of unrestrained Presidential unilateralism. Yet here
again, he confuses a strong President with an autonomous President. My
reform proposals may reduce Presidential autonomy, but their larger
goal is to enhance Presidential strength. By encouraging Congress not
simply to acquiesce, but to go on record as approving or disapproving the
President's initiatives, my goal is to enable Presidents to initiate policies
that will later command congressional support.35 While accepting most
of my proposals as "good ideas," Professor Trimble treats them as some-
how threatening to Presidential strength.36 As my book clarifies,
however,
[t]o the extent that these reform proposals... authorize certain presidential
activities, clarify zones of constitutional responsibility, promote interbranch
dialogue and cooperation, and avert cyclical interbranch conflict, they
32. See pp. 49-51, 57-62.
33. Trimble, supra note 12, at 351.
34. See p. 7 ("Today's world demands not simply a strong president, but one who operates
within an institutionally balanced constitutional structure of decision making."); p. 206 (my
"approach seeks to preserve the respective roles of the three branches under our National
Security Constitution with the president in the lead, Congress in a participating, partnership
role, and the courts as crucial arbiters of a lawful foreign policy"); p. 215 ("we need 'to devise
means of reconciling a strong and purposeful Presidency with equally strong and purposeful
forms of democratic control.' ")(quoting A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY X
(1973)).
35. As President Bush discovered when he sought emergency aid for Panama some time
after his invasion, short-term freedom to act unilaterally with respect to a particular country
hardly guarantees long-term congressional support for his policies. See, eg., 48 CONG. Q. 253,
345 (1990).
36. See Trimble, supra note 12, at 356. Professor Trimble takes serious issue only with my
endorsement of the Biden-Byrd condition to ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Force (INF) Treaty, a provision he claims "has no place in our modem foreign affairs jurispru-
dence." Id. at 358. But as I make clear elsewhere in this volume, I do not view the Biden-
Byrd Amendment as a radical departure, but rather as a hombook statement of constitutional
law, which would govern the interpretation of all duly ratified treaties, even if not expressly
enunciated in a Senate condition to treaty ratification. See generally Koh, The President Ver-
sus the Senate in Treaty Interpretation: What's All the Fuss About?, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 337 &




should ultimately strengthen, not weaken, the president's hand vis-i-vis the
outside world.
37
Professor Trimble finally speculates not only that Congress desires ac-
quiescence, but that the courts also "would normally prefer to avoid as-
sessing" the legality of executive conduct in foreign affairs.38 Even
assuming that this is so, what ultimately matters is not what Congress
and the courts want to do, but what the Constitution requires them to do.
There are many famous cases, including Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,39 which I am sure the Supreme Court would have preferred to
avoid deciding. But as my book argues, it is "[p]recisely because federal
judges enjoy life tenure and salary independence and owe nothing to
those who appointed them, [that] it is their business to say what the law
is in foreign affairs." 40 Similarly, the Constitution assigns Congress
many functions that I am sure it does not relish exercising, such as its
power to declare war or its power to lay and collect income taxes.4' But
surely "the framers did not entrust the war power to Congress for the
benefit of congressmen; they did so for the benefit of the citizenry." 42
The Constitution does not require, nor should it tolerate, judicial or con-
gressional acquiescence in unconstitutional Presidential behavior.
In sum, I fear that Professor Lobel has misjudged my mission, while
Professor Trimble has misunderstood my message. My mission is not to
exalt process over substance, but'to propose a constitutional, procedural
framework in which important substantive discussions about our post-
Cold War foreign policy can take place. My message is not that Presi-
dential strength or leadership is evil, but that the Constitution demands a
national security decision-making process in which the President leads,
Congress oversees rather than acquiesces, and the courts vigilantly police
the boundaries of unlawful conduct.
At bottom, The National Security Constitution is about dialogue. By
answering my colleagues' careful reviews, I hope that I, too, have opened
37. P. 218.
38. Trimble, supra note 12, at 358.
39. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
40. P. 224 (emphasis in original).
41. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; i d amend. XVI.
42. F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF
CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 214 (1986). See also Ely, The American War in Indochina,
Part I- The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv.
876, 922-23 (1990) ("[T]he constitutional prerogatives of Congress are not what's at stake [in
the war powers debate]. What is at stake - and the framers understood this well - is the
judgment that a single individual should not be able to lead the nation precipitously into war
and thereby risk the lives of all of us, especially our young people.").
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dialogue on issues that are far too important to be ignored and far too
rarely discussed with the thoughtfulness that my colleagues display.
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